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Abstract 
This study compared the trading characteristics of warrants and their 
underlying stocks. The Stock Exchange of Thailand provided a good platform for 
comparing the trading characteristics of warrants and their underlying stocks because 
both these securities are traded in the same market venue and have identical trading 
rules. Hence, the impact of trading protocol on intraday variation and an informed 
trader’s decision to buy warrants or stocks was controlled. The paper found that they 
have a similar downward sloping pattern of spreads, adverse selection component, 
and liquidity immediacy, U-shaped for volatility and trading volume, and upward-
sloping for depth and market order ratio. After controlling for the intraday patterns, 
spreads are positively associated with liquidity immediacy and negatively related to 
the market order ratio and total depth.  The results indicate that the market structure 
does affect the intraday pattern of trading characteristics. 
 
JEL Classifications: G10; G82 
Keywords: Warrants, spreads, depths, intraday pattern, Thailand 
___________________ 
* The authors thank Kee H. Chung, Quentin C. Chu, Chandrasekhar Krishnamurti, 
seminar participants at the 16th Australasian Finance and Banking in Sydney, 
University of Waikato, and Nanyang Tehcnological University.  We appreciate the 
financial support from the IRDG. Any remaining errors are the responsible of the 
authors.  
** Correspondence address: Department of Commerce, Massey University, Private 
Bag 102 904, North Shore Mail Centre, Auckland, New Zealand. Tel.: 64-9-414-0800 
Extension 9460; fax: 64-9-441-8177; e-mail: N.Visaltanachoti@massey.ac.nz 
Microstructure Trading Characteristics of 
 2
Warrants and Their Underlying Stocks 
 
1. Introduction  
Numerous studies have reported and explained the existence of an intraday 
pattern of quote- and trade-related variables on the stock market, but little research 
has been done on the intraday pattern of warrants in a limit order market. Early 
studies by Wood, McInish, and Ord (1985), McInish and Wood (1992), Foster and 
Viswanathan (1990), and Jain and Joh (1988) document the reversed-J shape pattern 
of spreads and U-shape pattern of volume for NYSE stocks. Admati and Pfleiderer 
(1988) use a game-based model to show that traders use clustering to benefit from the 
liquidity provided by other traders. Brock and Kleidon (1992) investigated the effect 
of periodic market closures on volume and bid ask spreads. During market closing, 
investors’ holdings deviate from the optimal portfolio due to their inability to trade 
when new information arrives, which results in a high demand to trade at the opening 
to reestablish the optimal portfolio. The higher trading activity before market closing 
reflects the demands of day traders and fund managers, who trade to minimize index-
tracking errors because most indices are computed with the closing price. 
Consequently, the high trading demand after the opening and before the closing 
increases trading volume and lowers bid-ask spreads compared to the rest of the day.  
The intraday patterns of spread and volume do not only exist in quoted 
markets such as the NYSE or NASDAQ. Lehman and Modest (1994) and Ahn and 
Cheung (1999) document an intraday variation of the bid-ask spread and volume on 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) and on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE), 
which operate without market makers. However, while the intraday behavior of 
derivative securities has been thoroughly examined on the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange (CBOE), where there are competing market makers, little research has been 
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conducted to investigate the intraday behavior of such securities traded in a pure order 
driven market.  
This study of the limit order book on SET aimed to provide evidence about the 
importance of the underlying market architecture to the intraday patterns of derivative 
securities. For this study, it was important for tests to be performed on both the 
warrant and stock markets while controlling for the underlying market architecture. 
Fortunately, The Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) trades both warrants and their 
underlying stocks on the same board under the same trading rules and market setup. 
Trading of the securities occurs in an automated limit order trading system in which 
the warrants are actively traded relative to their underlying stocks. The volume of the 
warrants traded was 26.9% and 51.3% of the underlying stocks in 1994 to 1996 and 
1997, respectively. The intraday pattern of bid-ask spreads and order flows of the 
warrants together with their underlying stocks was compared in this study. If the 
market structure has an influence on intraday patterns (see Chan, Chung, & Johnson, 
1995), both warrants and stocks should exhibit a similar intraday pattern of spreads 
and volume.  
In addition, the intraday order flow pattern of warrants and stocks was 
examined. Bae, Jang, and Park (2003) found that on the NYSE the mean proportion of 
limit orders was highest during the market opening when the spread was large and 
volatility was high. As such, the proportion of limit orders monotonically declined to 
its lowest level at the market closing when the spread was small and volatility was 
low. Their results show that limit order traders may choose to wait before they trade, 
submit a market order, or submit a limit order away from the best bid or ask quote. 
Moreover, by controlling for the intraday pattern, this present study aimed to shed 
light on the competition among limit order traders and strategic order submissions in 
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both stocks and warrants trading. The findings of this study should be of interest to 
regulators, traders, and international portfolio managers.  
This study found that the intraday spreads for both warrants and stocks were 
highest at the market open and declined during the day. Because these securities trade 
under the same market structure and trading rules, the findings strengthen the 
argument that market architecture does affect the intraday pattern of spreads (see 
Chan et al., 1995). In addition, market depth and total depth increased over time. The 
liquidity immediacy, a ratio between market depth and total depth, became lower over 
the trading day. The market order proportion increased throughout the trading day, 
and market orders were highest at the closing. SET exhibited the typical U-shaped 
pattern for volatility and volume. In general, there were no statistical differences 
between the various intraday patterns of warrants and their underlying stocks. 
After controlling for the intraday pattern, it was found that stock and warrant 
spreads were not associated with market depth, but spreads were negatively associated 
with total depth. In addition, spreads were positively associated with liquidity 
immediacy but negatively related to market order submissions. The positive 
association of spreads and liquidity immediacy supports the idea of competition 
among limit order traders. Higher spreads imply a higher expected reward for limit 
order trades and attract more immediate liquidity from liquidity providers. Spreads, 
which are a cost of immediacy to market order traders, were negatively related to the 
market order ratio of both warrants and stocks. This suggests that traders avoid using 
market orders compared to limit orders when execution costs are high.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the pertinent 
literatures and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the market architecture of 
the SET, data and methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results of the 
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intraday patterns, the adverse selection component, the relationship between spread 
and depths, liquidity immediacy, and the market order submission. Section 5 
summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses  
Many studies show that trading mechanisms have a significant effect on the 
intraday pattern of trade and quote variables. Amihud and Mendelson (1980) found 
that the distribution of open-to-open returns has greater dispersion, higher mode, and 
fatter tails than the distribution of close-to-close returns. They argue that the low 
variation of close-to-close returns stems from the fact that market makers try to 
stabilize prices and alleviate their cumulative inventory imbalance. They conclude 
that the open-to-open returns would capture the price behavior in a call market used at 
the opening trade, while the price impact of market makers’ influence should be 
examined in the close-to-close returns. Chan, Christie, and Schultz (1995) and Chan 
et al. (1995) argue that the difference of market power between the specialists in the 
NYSE and the dealers in NASDAQ and CBOE cause intraday variations in bid-ask 
spreads. They found that bid-ask spreads for NYSE stocks follow a U-shaped pattern, 
but spreads of NASDAQ stocks and CBOE options traded near the market closure are 
narrower. 
Besides the trading mechanisms, intraday patterns were also associated with 
the behavior of informed traders, especially when and what they trade. Black (1975) 
argues that options trading should provide two advantages: financial leverage and 
volatility trading. Several studies (e.g., Anthony, 1988; Manaster & Rendleman, 1982; 
Stephan & Whaley, 1990; Vijh, 1990) investigated the interrelationship between 
option and stock markets, but they did not find enough evidence to pinpoint where 
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informed traders initiate their trades. Chan, Chung, and Fong (2002) suggest that the 
lower liquidity in options markets compared to stock markets makes the informed 
trader hesitate to initiate trade in options markets. 
Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) show that depending on the depths and 
the availability of leverage informed traders may pool and trade in both option and 
stock markets or separate their trades in one market. Brock and Kleidon (1992) 
suggest that the non-trading period during market closure causes the price to deviate 
from equilibrium; therefore, the degree of asymmetric information is largest at the 
opening. Moreover, since asymmetric information is resolved through trading, 
liquidity traders may participate in trading around closing period more than other 
periods. For example, index-tracking funds rebalance their portfolio right before 
market closures to minimize the tracking error.  
The market closure impact implied by Brock and Kleidon (1992) is not limited 
to the stock market. Other markets, such as the options market, should exhibit a 
similar U-shaped pattern as the stock market. However, because the values of 
derivative securities are determined solely by the movement of their underlying 
assets, the intraday patterns of trade- and quote-related variables for options and 
stocks should not be different, no matter where informed traders initiate their trades. 
As a result, the following hypothesis should hold:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Warrants and stocks should have similar intraday patterns of trade- 
and quote-related variables. 
 
A number of studies document both intraday and interday U-shaped patterns 
of trading volume. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Foster and Viswanathan (1990), 
for example, explain that these patterns result from the strategic behavior of liquidity 
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traders and informed traders. Traders adjust their transactions to avoid times when 
trading costs are high. Informed traders only trade when they can make a profit out of 
their information, whereas market makers have full knowledge of the order flows and 
set prices to reflect the asset value. If traders’ performance with the market return is 
measured, trading is just a zero-sum game. This means that informed traders will 
trade and profit from liquidity traders. Hence, for the price to be informative, the 
presence of the liquidity trader is necessary.  
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) show that liquidity traders decide to concentrate 
their trades in periods close to the realization of their demand. The trading 
concentration would, in turn, attract informed traders to trade against them. However, 
it is still an optimal strategy for liquidity traders because the trading cost is minimized 
when they trade around the same time of the day. This model implies that during 
periods of high trading volume prices are relatively informative and trading costs are 
low.  
Foster and Viswanathan (1990) argue that the private information of informed 
traders becomes less valuable over time because portions of private information are 
revealed to the public through public announcements. Liquidity traders, therefore, 
have an incentive to postpone their trades during a period when informed traders 
remain in the market. Liquidity traders can receive private information by waiting for 
public announcements. If the information accumulated by an informed trader is higher 
during the weekend, assuming that the accuracy of a public announcement during the 
weekend is not different from an overnight announcement, the adverse selection 
problem would be more severe on Monday than on other days. This situation results 
in low trading volumes and high trading costs on Monday, when informed traders 
exercise their private information because they know their information has a short 
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lifespan. The trading pattern should be more pronounced for firms with more and 
better public information. Consequently, informed traders trade aggressively before 
the information is released to the public, and liquidity traders delay their trading. 
Therefore, it is possible to infer the private information from that period. Again, when 
the trading volume is lower, prices are more informative, and trading costs are higher. 
Conversely, neither the game theory model of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) 
nor the model of Foster and Viswanathan (1990) implies the higher spread and 
volume at the market opening and closing. Brock and Kleidon (1992) point out that 
passive portfolio managers choose to trade at the end of the trading day because the 
performance of these funds is measured on how closely the fund tracks an index. The 
tracking error would be smaller when trading at the end of a period because the index 
is calculated using closing prices. Moreover, their model predicts that liquidity risk is 
higher when holding on to securities that are not allowed to trade. In addition, 
investors may opt to trade at the market open in order to adjust their portfolio 
imbalances during the non-trading interval and trade again at the market close to 
adjust their portfolio for optimal overnight holding. This results in higher trading 
activity at the beginning and end of a trading interval. A higher volume at the end of a 
period may also come from the trades of institutional investors to mimic an index. 
The arguments of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Foster and Viswanathan (1993), and 
Brock and Kleidon (1992) led to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Trading volume is high at the opening and at the closing. 
 
Price volatility could be a result of a permanent price movement due to new 
information, a temporary price change due to liquidity trading, or both. Observing 
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high volatility during trading periods does not reveal the source of the volatility. On 
one hand, high volatility during trading periods could stem from temporary price 
changes due to liquidity trading. On the other hand, new public information arrives 
frequently during business hours and results in high volatility during trading periods. 
French and Roll (1986) separate these two arguments about volatility. They compared 
the volatility over a special event, when the New York Stock Exchange closed for 2 
days and other business entities stayed opened, with the volatility over the normal 
weekday period. If information is the only source of volatility, the variance over a 2-
day exchange holiday should be double that of normal weekday variance. Their 
results show that the variance of a 2-day exchange holiday was only 14% higher than 
those of the normal period. This result supports the argument that trading is also an 
important source of volatility.  
Harvey and Huang (1991) show that the pattern of volatility variation may 
reflect information flow. They found that because of a concentration of U.S. 
macroeconomic announcements on Thursday and Friday the volatility in the U.S. 
foreign exchange market was higher for all currencies during the first hour of Friday 
trading. In addition, a contagion effect caused an increase or decrease of volatility in 
one market as a result of activity in another market. King and Wadhwani (1990) 
proposed a model where traders in one market infer information from another market, 
resulting in market integration. They predicted a volatility drop when an associated 
market closes. Their results show that the volatility on the London market declined 
when the U.S. stock markets were shut down on Wednesdays during the second half 
of 1968. Chan, Fong, Kho, and Stulz (1996) found that European stocks listed on the 
U.S. stock market have high volatility during the early morning compared to 
American stocks with similar daily volume and volatility.  
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Past studies have shown that volatility is determined by trading activity and 
information flow. Moreover, liquidity traders cluster their trades and attract informed 
traders around the opening and closing periods. The intraday pattern of volatility 
should be similar to that of volume. This led to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Volatility is high at the opening and at the closing of trading sessions. 
 
Previous literature view the bid-ask spread as a measure of trading costs or a 
compensation to market makers for order processing costs, inventory costs, and 
asymmetric information costs. Garman (1976) and Ho and Stoll (1981) show that 
market makers face an inventory imbalance due to the uncertainty of buy and sell 
order arrivals. Hence, the inventory imbalance would likely be most severe at the 
closing of the market. To mitigate the inventory imbalance problem, dealers use bid-
ask spreads to manage their inventory by increasing bid or lowering ask quotes to 
attract buy and sell orders from others. Madhavan (1992) points out that the 
asymmetric information problem should be alleviated over the trading day because 
trading is a process that incorporates both private and public information into price. 
As a result, the asymmetric information component in the bid-ask spread should 
decline and make the total bid-ask spread fall throughout the trading day. 
Although the early study by McInish and Wood (1992) describes the U-shape 
pattern of spreads for stocks listed on the NYSE, the intraday patterns of spreads 
found on other exchanges are different. Chan et al. (1995) compared the intraday 
pattern of spreads for actively traded CBOE options and their NYSE-traded 
underlying stocks. They found that the bid-ask spread pattern of options is different 
from that of the underlying stocks. While both options and stocks have a wide spread 
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at the open, their spreads are different at the close. At the close, the spreads of options 
are narrow, while the spreads of the stocks become wide again. They explain that the 
difference in spread variation arises from the differences in the market architecture 
used by the two markets. On CBOE, market makers compete with each other, whereas 
the market making at the NYSE is monopolistic. Consistent with the competing 
hypothesis, Chan et al. (1995) and Affleck-Graves, Hedge, and Miller (1994) found 
that the bid-ask spread for NASDAQ stocks declines throughout the day. Based on 
these arguments, the following hypotheses should hold:  
 
Hypothesis 4: The bid-ask spread is high at the opening and declines throughout the 
day.  
Hypothesis 5: An adverse selection component in bid-ask spread falls throughout the 
day.  
 
Copeland and Galai (1983) point out that the bid and ask quotes placed by 
market makers can be viewed as a straddle option, where the difference of straddle 
prices forms the bid-ask spread. Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993) found that during 
the earning announcement period specialists quote a wide spread with a small depth to 
counter their asymmetric information risk. In a pure limit order market, liquidity 
providers receive the spread as compensation for their inventory costs and adverse 
selection cost. Hence, the availability of depth should be negatively associated with 
the presence of informed traders. In addition, because the degree of asymmetric 
information declines over the course of trading, the depth in a limit order book should 
increase throughout the trading day. This led to the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 6: Depth is low at the opening and increases throughout the day. 
Hypothesis 7: There is an inverse relationship between bid-ask spread and depth. 
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Brock and Kleidon (1992) argue that fund managers who replicate an index 
movement are likely to submit market orders to execute their trades around the market 
close. Trading at the market close could help minimize tracking errors because the 
index level is generally computed from the closing prices of its constituency stocks. 
Moreover, day traders also use market orders to close their positions around the 
closing period. Thus, if the market order ratio is defined as the number of market 
orders divided by the number of total orders, the following hypothesis should hold:  
 
Hypothesis 8: Market order ratio is low at the opening and increases throughout the 
day. 
 
While the bid-ask spread compensates limit order traders for providing 
liquidity immediacy, it is a cost for market order traders. Biais, Hillion, and Spatt 
(1995), Chung, Van Ness, and Van Ness (1999), and Bae, Jang, and Park (2003) 
found that when the bid-ask spread is narrow and the order size is small market orders 
are used more than limit orders. In other words, it is an optimal strategy to use market 
orders when the cost of doing so is low and to use limit orders when the cost is high. 
In addition, among limit order traders, the competition to provide liquidity is higher 
when the compensation (i.e., spread) of doing so is high. These arguments led to the 
following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 9: There is a positive relationship between bid-ask spread and liquidity 
immediacy. 
Hypothesis 10: There is a positive relationship between bid-ask spread and market 
order ratio. 
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3. Market Architecture, Data and Methodology 
3.1 Market Architecture of Stock Exchange of Thailand 
SET had operated under the open auction through the trading floor since its 
inception on April 30, 1975. After May 31, 1991, the trading system was changed to 
an automated limit order trading system called the Automated System for the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (ASSET). The exchange has five trading boards: main, foreign, 
big lot, odd lot, and special. Common stocks, preferred stocks, warrants, and unit 
trusts are traded on the main board, big lot board, and odd lot board. Only stocks 
registered under foreigners’ names are traded on the foreign board. Government and 
state enterprise bonds, debentures, and convertible debentures are traded on the 
special board. Each trading unit, called “board lot,” contains 100 shares of a security, 
but for stocks trading at 500 baht or more for 6 consecutive months, one board lot 
equals 50 shares. Orders of less than one board lot are traded on the odd lot board, 
while orders of more than 3 million baht or 1 million shares are traded on the big lot 
board. 
The ASSET system consists of two trading possibilities: Automatic Order 
Matching (AOM), which is the main system; and Put-Through (PT), which is the 
support system. Under AOM, brokerage firms submit their orders on-line to the 
ASSET system, and the orders are arranged according to price-then-time priority. 
Under PT, brokers can deal and negotiate directly between each other, and the price 
can be changed and may not follow the price spread rules. When the negotiation is 
complete, the result is sent to the ASSET system for approval. Only trading on the 
special board and the big lot board can be done on the PT system. The foreign board 
can use both the AOM and PT systems. 
 14
Trading on SET occurs from Monday to Friday, excluding public holidays, in 
two trading sessions each day. The morning and afternoon sessions operate from 
10:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m., respectively. The local time of 
Thailand is GMT + 7 hours. ASSET determines the opening price of each security in 
the morning and afternoon sessions using a call market system. The opening price is 
determined according to three criteria: First, the opening price must generate the 
highest trading volume; second, if more than one price has the highest trading 
volume, the price closest to the preceding closing price will be chosen; and third, after 
fulfilling the first two criteria, if there is still more than one price, the highest price 
becomes the opening price. Note that the last criteria could result in a bullish bias. 
Currently, the call market system is used to calculate the opening and closing price of 
a security at opening and closing times, but during the year 1997, the call market 
system did not exist at closing time. 
ASSET allows traders to place seven order types: market order, limit order, at-
the-open order, at-the-close order, immediate-or-cancel order, fill-or-kill order, and 
conditioned published order. Market order is simply an order to buy or sell securities 
at the best prevailing price. Limit order is an order to trade at a price no worse than 
the limit price specified. If no trade occurs, the order will stand as an offer to trade in 
the limit order book. At-the-open orders and at-the-close orders are orders to buy or 
sell securities at the opening price or at the closing price. The immediate-or-cancel 
order is an order to buy or sell securities immediately at a specific price. If there is 
any unmatched volume, the remaining volume will be canceled. The fill-or-kill order 
is an order to buy or sell the whole ordered volume at a specific price. If this condition 
cannot be met, the order will be canceled. The conditioned published order is an order 
that allows a trader to reveal some portion of his or her order size and hide the 
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remaining order from the public. The volume of a published order must be at least 10 
board lots and indicate an equal number of shares to be published or revealed. When 
the revealed portion is transacted, the next portion is placed in the queue until the 
whole ordered volume is completely transacted. 
 
3.2 Data Description 
The data set provided by SET contains orders and trades for all warrants and 
underlying stocks from January 2, 1997 to December 31, 1997. Each record in the 
order file consists of the order arrival time stamped to the nearest one-hundredth of a 
second, the order identification (ID), the buy- or sell-order indicator, the ordered 
price, the number of shares ordered, and the order instructions. The status of an order 
by the end of a trading day is also included in the order file. This order status can be 
only one of the following four types: opened, matched order, canceled by firms, or 
canceled by the system. The trade file contains the traded time, the trade ID, the 
traded price, trading volume in number of shares, and the IDs of the corresponding 
bid and ask orders. 
This study covers the period from January 2, 1997 to November 1997. The 
month of December 1997 is truncated to control for the possible impact of the new 
ceiling floor rule implemented on December 1, 1997. Both warrants and their 
underlying stocks were used in this study. Figure 1 shows that during 1997 the 
average trading volume of warrants averaged 6,541 million baht a month, which was 
51.3% of the volume traded by their underlying stocks. In order to compare trading 
activities across different time periods, the trading volume was collected from 1994 to 
1996, available on the Integrated Stock Exchange of Thailand Information 
Management System (usually called I-SIMS CDs), and the average monthly trading 
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volume of warrants was computed. During 1997, the average monthly trading volume 
of warrants was about 4,473 million baht, or 26.9% of the volume traded by their 
underlying stocks. These preliminary results show that the warrants on SET were 
actively traded. In addition, the warrant to stock trading ratio in 1997 had almost 
doubled from the previous period. In fact, during July 1997, the trading volume of 
warrants exceeded that of their underlying stocks. In 1997, a financial crisis in 
Thailand swept through much of Asia. It began when the Thai government freely 
floated the baht on July 2, 1997. Hence, the high trading activity of warrants supports 
the argument that traders use warrants to take advantage of volatile trading. 
For the intraday analysis, a 30-minute interval was used as a tradeoff between 
non-synchronous trading problems and stale trading problems. If a 1-hour interval is 
chosen, trades and quotes in the same interval but on different days may not be 
comparable. In addition, using long intervals would not provide enough intervals per 
day, and the intraday variations might not stand out clearly. On the other hand, if a 1-
minute interval is used, order- and trade-related variables may not be informative or 
computed because too many intervals are without orders and/or trades.  
Thirty-nine warrants were traded on SET in 1997. A number of these warrants 
and their underlying stocks were not traded on every trading day. A recent study by 
Ding and Charoenwong (2003) shows that the bid-ask spread of thinly-traded futures 
contracts computed from days with trades are more informative than those computed 
from days without trades. In light of this finding, the following criterion was used for 
the sample selection. Each of the sample warrants and underlying stocks must have 
had at least 40 synchronously trading days with more than 20 trades a day. This 
criterion reduced the data from 39 pairs of warrants and stocks to 26 pairs. As 
discussed earlier, securities with very low prices could be constrained by minimum 
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tick size and, consequently, have very large relative spreads. To reduce the impact of 
minimum tick size on relative spreads, the trading days when either warrants or stocks 
traded below 5 baht were not included. This additional criterion reduced the sample to 
19 pairs of warrants and underlying stocks, with an average of 129 trading days for 
each security. 
Table 1 contains detailed characteristics about the sample warrants and 
underlying stocks. Given the above sample selection criteria, it is not surprising that 
the sample securities mostly came from the finance and securities industry (11 out of 
19) because this industry is the most actively traded on SET. Most of the sample 
warrants were long-term call options, whose maturity ranged from about 1 year to 
almost 5 years. Given the long maturities, it is not surprising that most warrants were 
issued as deep-out-of-the-money options. The average prices of the warrants and 
underlying stocks varied from 9.1 to 85.57 baht and from 17.65 to 331.23 baht, 
respectively. 
Traded and quoted variables were measured as follows. The bid-ask spread 
was defined as the difference between the best bid and best ask prices divided by the 
midpoint of the quotes. The market depth was based on the total number of shares 
posted at the best bid and best ask prices. The total depth or thickness of the book was 
the total number of shares from orders currently standing in the book. In addition, 
volatility, trading volume, and market order ratio were computed, where volatility was 
the average value of absolute returns, trading volume was the sum of trading volume 
in the interval and measured in terms of million baht, and market order ratio was the 
number of market orders that arrived in the interval divided by all orders that arrived 
in the same interval. 
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Most of warrants and stocks in the data set ranged in price from 10 to 50 baht 
and had a minimum tick size of 0.5% to 2.5%. The warrants had an average spread of 
2.7%, higher than the stocks’ spread of 1.7%. The minimum nominal price change 
was not uniform across prices because, as mentioned earlier, SET aims to balance the 
percentage of minimum price change, so there are different tick sizes for different 
prices. A stock with a trading price of 5 baht had a minimum price change of 2%, 
while a stock price of 20 baht had a minimum price change of 1%. Low-priced 
securities tended to have a higher spread. The cross-sectional average market depths 
were 45,766 shares for warrants and 74,189 shares for stocks. In terms of volume, 
there were five warrants in the top 20 for trading volume during 1997, indicating a 
relatively high liquidity of warrants compared to stocks. 
Table 2 and Table 3 show the cross-section statistics of order file, limit order 
book, and trade file in the morning and afternoon sessions of warrants and stocks, 
respectively.  The parametric paired t-test and the non-parametric signed rank test 
were used to find the difference between variables in the morning and afternoon 
sessions. Warrants and stocks had a higher number of orders in the morning than in 
the afternoon. The number of morning orders of warrants and stocks was 366 and 331 
orders, respectively, while the number of afternoon orders of warrants and stocks was 
264 and 229 orders, respectively. The proportions of fully executed orders were 
higher in the morning: 9.04% for warrants and 4.21% for stocks. Both stocks and 
warrants had a higher rate of marketable order arrivals and larger marketable order 
sizes in the afternoon than in the morning. A comparison of the order file in the 
morning and in the afternoon suggests the possibility of an intraday variation of 
orders. 
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For the limit order book, the absolute spread was the difference between the 
best ask and best bid, and the relative spread was the absolute spread divided by the 
average of the bid and ask. The relative spreads of warrant were 2.92% in the morning 
and 2.41% in the afternoon. Similarly, the relative spreads of stock were high in the 
morning (1.86%). The spreads fell in the afternoon (1.5%). The absolute spread was 
also higher in the morning than in the afternoon. Market depth, a sum of the shares 
standing at the best bid and the best ask of the limit order book, was lower in the 
morning than in the afternoon. The morning market depth of warrants was 42,411 
shares, and it rose to 49,960 shares in the afternoon. The market depths of stocks were 
65,582 shares in the morning and 84,948 shares in the afternoon. 
Two other types of depth were computed in this study. The displayed depth 
referred to the orders standing in the book that were visible to the trader. Specifically, 
the displayed depth was the sum of the orders at the best three quotes on the bid and 
ask side. The total depth was the average total limit orders in the book. Both displayed 
depth and total depth of warrants and stocks were statistically higher in the afternoon 
than in the morning.  
In this study, liquidity immediacy was defined as the ratio between the market 
depth and the total depth in the order book. Liquidity immediacy was defined in order 
to investigate whether an increase of total depth arose from the depth at the market or 
from the depth away from the market. For warrants, the morning liquidity immediacy 
was 8.36%, and it fell to 6.57% in the afternoon. Liquidity immediacy of stocks was 
11.73% in the morning, but it rose slightly to 11.84% in the afternoon. From the 
comparison of the order book in the morning and in the afternoon, it was evident that 
the characteristics of an order book may follow a time-varying pattern. 
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The number of trades of warrants was higher than stock trades, and the trades 
occurred more frequently in the morning than in the afternoon. There were 270 and 
206 trades of warrants and 231 and 195 trades of stocks in the morning and afternoon, 
respectively. Trade size, measured in number of shares, was higher for warrants than 
stocks. The warrant trade sizes were 2,708 and 2,628 shares, while the stock trade 
sizes were smaller at 1,976 shares and 2,081 shares for the morning and afternoon 
sessions, respectively. Furthermore, warrants had a positive return in the morning and 
negative return in the afternoon, but stocks did not have a statistical difference 
between morning and afternoon returns. Both stocks and warrants had a higher return 
volatility in the morning than in the afternoon. 
 
3.3 Intraday Variation Analysis  
In this study, a regression was used in the intraday variation analysis of 
spreads, depths, liquidity immediacy, volume, volatility, and market order ratio of the 
warrants and their underlying stocks traded on SET. Each of the variables was 
regressed against two control variables and a set of dummy variables to capture both 
intraday and interday patterns. Formula 1 shows the regression model: 
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where Yt is the variable of interest, which was the bid-ask spread, market depth, 
displayed depth, total depth, liquidity immediacy, volatility, order volume, and market 
order ratio. The regularity patterns were captured by 9 intraday 30-minute dummy 
variables (dtime) and 5 day-of-the-week dummy variables (dweek). Each intraday 
interval was 30 minutes. To facilitate the interpretation of the dummy coefficients, the 
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intercept, and all dummy variables, with a constraint that the sum of dummy 
coefficients in the same group is zero, were included. This constraint helped to avoid 
the perfect multicollinearity. This scheme of dummy variables was used in several 
recent studies of intraday pattern (see, for example, Ahn & Cheung, 1999; Lehman & 
Modest, 1994). The regression was performed for 19 individual warrants and stocks. 
The intercept of the regression (α) represents the cross-sectional average value of the 
variable of interest. Note that the number of observations for each stock was not equal 
because nonactive trading days were truncated. 
 
3.4 Adverse Selection Component of Spread 
The hypotheses that spread has a downward intraday pattern and market depth 
has an upward intraday pattern have been explained by Madhavan (1992): That is, 
asymmetric information is resolved through trading. In order to test if asymmetric 
information falls over the course of trading, this study computed the intraday variation 
of proportion of asymmetric components in the spreads. From the liquidity providers’ 
point of view, spread compensates for three costs: order processing, inventory, and 
adverse selection. Among many decomposition models, adverse selection cost was 
estimated using six widely cited models: Three models are based on trade price, and 
three models make use of the quote midpoint price.  
Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) derived the adverse selection 
cost using price and trade indicator variables while allowing correlated order flows as 
follows: 
(2) The MRR97 model 
( ) ( ) tttt QQP εραββα ++−+=∆ −1  
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where Pt is the trade price; Qt is the trade indicator, which equals 1 for buy-initiated 
trades and -1 for sell-initiated trades; α measures the adverse selection component; β 
measures the inventory and order processing component; and ρ measures the 
autocorrelation of trade indicators. The parameters α, β, and ρ were estimated by the 
Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) with Newey and West’s (1987) 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) covariance matrix. The 
moment conditions were as follows: 
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De Jong, Nijman, and Roell (1996) decomposed the price effects of trading on 
the Paris Bourse into transitory and permanent parts. They extend the model of 
Glosten (1994), where there were no explicit order processing costs, and use trade 
price, trade size, and trade indicator as input variables:  
(4) The DNR96 model 
( ) tttttttt QqeQeQqRQRP εµ +++∆+∆+=∆ −−− 1111010  
Order-processing component = 
( ) ( ) t
e
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The adverse selection component is 
( )
t
e
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++   
where Pt is the trade price at time t; Qt is the trade indicator variable; and qt is the 
round lot trade size. The model in this study was estimated by the Ordinary Least 
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Square (OLS) and adjusted the standard errors using Newey and West’s (1987) 
method. 
Glosten and Harris (1988) constructed one of the earliest decomposition 
models. Their model is based on the trade indicator variable, which could be 
integrated into the De Jong, Nijman, and Roell (1996) context as follows: 
(5) The GH88 model 
( ) tttttttt QqzQzQqcQcP εµ +++∆+∆+=∆ − 11010  
where Pt is the transaction price at time t; Qt is the trade indicator variable; and qt is 
the trade size measured in multiples of minimum trading units, which was 100 shares. 
The adverse selection component is z0 + z1qt; and the order processing component is 
c0 + c1qt. 
George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991) allowed the serial dependent of 
expected return to have the same impact on trade and quote midpoint returns. Their 
model is as follows: 
(6) The GKN91 model 
( ) ( ) ttqtt QsMP εαβ +∆−+=∆−∆ −112  
where Pt is the transaction price at time t; Qt is the trade indicator variable; Mt is the 
quote midpoint; and sq is the quoted spread. The order processing cost and adverse 
selection cost are β and α. 
Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) developed empirical estimates of the bid-ask 
spread component following Huang and Stoll (1994), Lin (1992), and Stoll (1989). In 
their model, the quote revision changes in response to a trade, and the revision is a 
fraction of the effective spread: 
(7) The LSB95 model 
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( ) tttt MPM εα +−=∆ −− 11  
where Pt is the transaction price at time t; and Mt is the quote midpoint. The adverse 
selection cost is α. 
Huang and Stoll (1997) reconciled the decomposition model based on the 
trade indicator and quote midpoint and developed a general model that allows a three-
way decomposition of adverse selection, inventory, and order processing costs:  
(8) The HS97 model 
( ) ( ) tttttt QSQSM επαβα +

−−

+=∆ −−−− 2211 2212  
where Qt is the trade indicator variable; Mt is the quote midpoint; St is the quoted 
spread prior to trade; and π is the probability that the trade indicator at time t is 
opposite in sign to the trade indicator at time t-1. The parameters α, β, and 1-α-β refer 
to the adverse selection cost, the inventory holding cost, and the order processing cost, 
respectively. The model in this study was constructed using the Generalized Method 
of Moment (GMM) with Newey and West’s (1987) Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) covariance matrix. The moment condition of the 
regression is as follow: 
(9) 
( ) ( ) 212 21| −−− −= ttt QQQE π  
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Intraday Pattern of Spreads 
From the regression in equation 1, the cross-sectional average bid-ask spread 
of warrants was 2.7%, wider than the 1.7% of the stocks spread. This result indicates 
a higher execution cost in warrant trading compared to stock trading. The relative 
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spread of stocks on SET was higher than the 0.6% of stock spreads on the NYSE and 
higher than the 1.15% of stock spreads on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). 
However, it was lower than the 1.73% of stock spreads on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange (HKSE).1 The intraday variation of relative spreads of warrants and stocks 
is shown in Table 4 and Table 5. The relative bid-ask spread was highest 10:00 a.m. 
to 10:30 a.m. Warrant and stock spreads in this period were 1.13% and 0.71% higher 
than the average relative spread in other periods. The dummy coefficients of other 
intervals were weakly negative, and some of them were statistically insignificant. 
Nevertheless, the magnitude of the dummy interval coefficient monotonically 
declined to the lowest value of -0.45% for warrants and -0.24% for stocks during the 
last 30 minutes of the trading day. Hence, the spreads of both warrants and stocks 
have a similar downward pattern over trading time, where spreads are highest right 
after the opening and lowest before the market close.  
This result confirms the effect of market structure on the intraday pattern 
documented in Chan et al. (1995). The options traded on the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange (CBOE), which is a competitive dealer market, had narrower spreads at the 
closing period compared to wider spreads of their underlying stocks traded on the 
monopoly specialist NYSE. In contrast, warrants and their underlying stocks listed on 
SET were traded under the same market structure and regulations, and both exhibited 
the same intraday reverse J-shape pattern. The results of this study suggest that the 
pattern of stock spreads is similar to the bid-ask spread pattern on the NYSE, TSE, 
and HKSE (see Ahn & Cheung, 1999; Lehman & Modest, 1994; McInish & Wood, 
1992). The impact of market closure also appeared at the day of the week pattern. As 
                                                 
1The average NYSE spread is from the 1994 NYSE fact book; the average TSE spread is from January 
1991 to April 1993 (see Lehaman & Modest, 1994). The average HKSE spread is from October 1996 
to March 1994 (see Ahn & Cheung, 1999).  
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shown in Tables 4 and 5, the spreads of warrants and stocks were highest on 
Mondays, and they were 0.25% and 0.06% higher than other days of the week. 
 
4.2 Intraday Pattern of Depths 
While spread is the most popular proxy for the price of liquidity, depths of a 
limit order book measure the size of liquidity. Lee et al. (1993) show that providers of 
liquidity use both depths and spreads to manage the risk of asymmetric information. 
Four variables were used in this study to constitute depths: market depth, displayed 
depth, total depth, and the ratio of the market depth to total depth or liquidity 
immediacy. It was thought that a comparison of liquidity immediacy across different 
periods might reveal the change of market depth relative to total depth. 
Table 4 and Table 5 show that the cross-sectional active trading day weighted 
market depths of warrants and stocks were 45,766 shares and 74,189 shares, 
respectively. Active stocks were likely to have thick depths and more active trading 
days, so stocks had higher cross-sectional day weighted market depths than the cross-
sectional average market depth. The active trading day weighted displayed depths of 
warrants and stocks were 188,825 shares and 190,710 shares, respectively, while the 
active trading day weighted total depth of warrants and stocks was 712,856 shares and 
567,240 shares, respectively. All three types of depth were low at the opening and 
continually increased to highest at the closing. Compared to spread, the intraday 
pattern of market depth was a reverse image of the intraday spread pattern. 
As shown on Figure 2, the market depth was lowest at the opening and 
monotonically increased to highest at the closing. Total depths also had similar 
upward intraday patterns. While both market depths and total depths increased over 
the course of the trading day, the liquidity immediacy of warrants monotonically 
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declined, but the liquidity immediacy of stocks followed the U-shape pattern. The 
cross-sectional average of the liquidity immediacy of warrants and stocks was 7.56% 
and 11.78%. The liquidity immediacy ratio could be viewed as a proxy for the degree 
of the limit order trader’s willingness to supply liquidity. The high liquidity 
immediacy indicates the high degree of competition between limit order traders to 
supply liquidity. The pattern of liquidity immediacy was similar to the pattern of 
spread, suggesting that limit order traders compete to supply liquidity. Because spread 
is compensation for liquidity suppliers, wide spread and high liquidity immediacy 
reflected the higher competition among limit order traders. When compared to the 
NYSE, the results in this study concur with Lee et al.’s (1993) assertion that the 
liquidity supplied by limit order traders in a limit order book of warrants and stocks is 
reflected in both spreads and depths. The pattern of total depths and liquidity 
immediacy are shown on Figure 3. 
 
4.3 Intraday Pattern of Market Order 
The average values of the market order ratio across all time intervals were 
39.72% for warrants and 40.07% for stocks. As shown in Table 4 and Table 5, the 
market order ratio was lowest during the first 30-minute interval and increased over 
time to reach the highest at the last 30-minute interval. There was also a lunch-break 
effect for market order submissions. After lunch, the market order ratio dropped 
during the first 30-minute interval before increasing again. During the afternoon 
session, the pattern of market order ratio was the U-shape. An increase in market 
order submissions was consistent with the increase of market depths and the decrease 
of spreads. Market order traders consumed the liquidity supplied by the limit order 
traders.  
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The intraday pattern of spreads, depths, and market order submissions 
supports the hypothesis that investors strategically submit more (less) market orders 
when the spread, which is the cost of submission, is low (high) and when the market 
depths are high (low) (see Bae, Jang, & Park, 2003; Biais et al., 1995). Keim and 
Madhavan (1995) show that the institutional trader who is a liquidity trader, such as 
index fund managers, tends to use market orders. This observation is consistent with 
the results of this study, which show a large increase in market orders during closing. 
A comparison of market order ratio between warrants and stocks is shown on Figure 
4, which illustrates the similarity of intraday pattern of market ratio between warrants 
and stocks. 
 
4.4 Intraday Pattern of Volatility and Volume 
It is well-known that the intraday pattern of returns, volatility, and volume 
follow a U-shape pattern.2 Brooks and Chiou (1995), Harris (1986, 1989), and Vijh 
(1988) document the increase in NYSE stock prices on the last trade of the day and 
suggest that this is the result of increases in trades at ask prices, which may reflect the 
demand to cover a short-selling position or the intention to affect the closing price. 
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) explain the high opening return as a result of 
information asymmetry arising from the concentration of informed trading at the 
opening. As noted in Brock and Kleidon (1992) and Gerety and Mulherin (1994), the 
accumulation of overnight information and the inability to trade hinder the price 
discovery process and cause a reduction in an optimal portfolio, resulting in high 
opening volatility and volume.  
                                                 
2See Wood, McInish, and Ord (1985) for intraday return patterns. For the intraday patterns of return 
and volatility, see Brock and Kleidon (1992), Foster and Viswanathan (1993), and Jain and Joh (1988).  
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As shown in Table 4 and Table 5, the coefficients of volatility and order 
volumes were statistically positive at the first and the last trading intervals. Consistent 
with previous studies, the volatility of both warrants and stocks exhibit the U-shape 
pattern. The volatility at the first trading interval of the day was the highest level, and 
it fell as time went by before increasing again at the closing interval. The impact of 
trade discontinuity due to the 2-hour lunch break appeared in the intraday volatility 
pattern: Volatility was higher during the first 30 minutes in the afternoon session. 
Large firms were likely to have smaller volatility. Furthermore, there was evidence of 
the U-shape pattern in order volume, confirming the same pattern found in many other 
markets, including the U.S., which has specialists and dealers to provide the liquidity 
of the last resort, and the pure limit order markets such as the TSE, the Paris Bourse, 
and the HKSE. Figure 5 and Figure 6 show that the intraday variation of warrants and 
stocks on SET follows the U-shape pattern.  
 
4.5 Adverse Selection Proportion of Spread 
In this study, the cross-sectional statistics and intraday variation of the 
proportion of asymmetric information were computed for all six models. Three 
models (MRR97, DNR96, and GH88) use only trade data that are highly significant 
and have strong positive correlations among themselves. The other three models 
(GKN91, LSB95, and HS97) employ both the trade and quote data, and their 
estimates are positively significant with moderate correlations.  
As shown in Table 6, the cross-sectional mean of the adverse selection 
proportion varies from 12.6% to 60.9% for warrants and from 13.5% to 47.9% for 
stocks. The maximum estimation comes from the GKN91 model, while the HS97 
model gives the minimum estimation. The adverse selection cost proportions 
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estimated from the other models lies between 10% and 30%. The adverse selection 
cost proportions were usually highest after the market has been open for 30 minutes. 
Most of the models show that the lowest adverse selection proportions occur at the 
closing intervals. Lin et al. (1995) show that the adverse selection costs of warrants 
and stocks consist of 23.3% and 31.6%, respectively, of total spread during the 
opening period. These proportions fell to 19.1% and 15.3% at the closing period for 
warrants and stocks, respectively.  
The findings in this study are consistent with the explanation that the adverse 
selection cost declines over time. Madhavan (1992) notes that the adverse selection 
problem is resolved by trading. This implies that on SET the adverse selection 
component at the open was higher than during trading intervals throughout the day, 
and it was lowest at the close. Other models report the higher adverse selection 
component at the close. This might be a result of strategic order submissions by 
informed traders. Handa and Schwartz (1996) and Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) show 
that limit orders placed at the best or better than the prevailing quotes yield superior 
returns to limit orders placed behind the book and market order. As a result, to 
maximize the value of their information, informed traders may use a marketable limit 
order, but if no execution occurs before the market close, they may switch to a market 
order for immediate execution. Therefore, liquidity providers before the close will 
demand a compensation for a higher asymmetric information cost. However, as noted 
in Ahn, Cai, Hamao, and Ho (2002), all of the models considered here assume that the 
information is immediately impounded to price after each trade.  If the trading pattern 
is endogenously determined and lagged trades and quotes have an impact on current 
trade and quote, the vector autoregressive model of Hasbrouck (1988) may be more 
appropriate. 
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4.6 Association of Spreads, Depths, Liquidity Immediacy, and Market  
Order Ratio 
The results of the investigation into intraday pattern in the previous section 
show that over the trading day spread and liquidity immediacy decline, while market 
depth, displayed depth, total depth, and market order ratio have an upward pattern. 
This study also examined the correlation between spreads and other variables, 
including depths, immediacy, and market order ratio when the intraday pattern is and 
is not controlled. Without a control of intraday intervals, there was no evidence of a 
relevant association between spreads and market depths for both warrants and stocks. 
However, spreads were negatively associated with total depth for both warrants and 
stocks. The correlations of spread and depth were -0.17 for warrants and -0.14 for 
stocks. Furthermore, the correlations of spreads and liquidity immediacy were 
statistically significant, with 0.21 for warrants and 0.19 for stocks. Finally, the 
correlation of spreads and market order submissions was statistically significant, with 
-0.16 for warrants and -0.13 for stocks.  
However, the correlation of spreads and the other variables may arise purely 
from a strong relationship in a certain period of the day, especially from the opening 
and closing period. A close examination of correlation at each trading interval would 
confirm whether such relationships occur at a specific period of a trading day. As 
shown in Table 5.7, the association of spread and other variables across the time 
intervals of the day and across weekdays was not sharply different from the 
relationship without controlling the time variation. This shows that the intraday effect 
has little impact on the relationship of spreads and other variables. 
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In this study, spread had a negative association with total depths, which 
implies that limit order traders use both spreads and depths to provide liquidity, which 
is consistent with the results reported by Lee et al. (1993). Spread had a positive 
correlation with liquidity immediacy, confirming the hypothesis of competition 
among liquidity providers. Limit order traders received the bid-ask spread to 
compensate for providing liquidity. When the compensation was higher, limit order 
traders competed among themselves to offer more competitive prices. 
Spread was negatively correlated to the market order ratio. This implies that 
market order traders observed the spread and strategically designed their strategy to 
minimize their trading costs. They preferred to use the market order when the cost of 
trading, measured by spread, was low. 
 
5 Conclusion 
The results of this study support the idea that the market structure has a 
significant effect on the intraday pattern of spread, depth, market order ratio, 
volatility, and volume. In other words, financial instruments traded under the same 
market mechanisms should have the same pattern. Chan et al. (1995) found that the 
spread of the CBOE options was narrower at the close, while stock spreads were 
wider. They explain that the opposite closing patterns between options and stocks 
were a result of differences in market structure, which are competitive dealers on 
CBOE and a single specialist on the NYSE. Chan et al. (1995) also show that 
NASDAQ stocks have a narrow spread near the close due to the absence of market 
power among NASDAQ dealers. For both warrants and stocks, the results of the 
present study show wider spreads at the open and gradually narrower spreads before 
the spreads reach the minimum level at the close. Because warrants and stocks are 
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traded under the same market structure, the similar pattern of intraday spreads 
supports the idea that market structure influences intraday patterns.  
The intraday pattern of trade and quote variables for both warrants and stocks 
were compared in this study. On SET, five warrants were in the top 20 for trading 
volume during 1997, indicating a relatively high liquidity of warrants compared to 
stocks. Generally, the intraday spreads, depths, volatility, volume, and market order 
ratio of warrants and stocks had a similar pattern. Percentage spreads were the highest 
at the opening, monotonically decreased during the later trading period, and became 
lowest at the closing. Moreover, warrant spreads were higher than stock spreads for 
the whole period. The market depths, total depths, and market order ratio were at their 
lowest level in the opening and increased to the highest level at the closing. The 
volatility of warrants was higher than stocks, and both had the U-shape pattern similar 
to the U-shape pattern of return and volume. The intraday pattern of liquidity 
immediacy of warrants and stocks was different. For warrants, liquidity immediacy 
had a downward shape, while it was relatively constant for stocks. This suggests that 
competition among limit order traders to supply liquidity in warrant trading was not 
as high as for stocks. However, to confirm this hypothesis, a formal test is required 
and should be the subject of future research. 
This study also shows the negative association of spreads and total depths and 
spreads and market order ratio and the positive association of spreads and liquidity 
immediacy. These three relationships occurred in all time intervals, so they did not 
occur because of a strong relationship in a specific interval. The inverse relationship 
between spread and depth supports the notion that limit order traders use both spread 
and depth to manage their submission strategy. However, there was an insignificant 
association between spreads and market depths, but the negative correlation of 
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spreads and market order ratio implied a strategic market order submission. The 
positive association of spreads and liquidity immediacy can be interpreted as 
competition among limit order traders.  
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Table 1  Profile of Selected Warrants and Their Underlying Stocks  
This Table presents the details of 19 warrants and their underlying stocks. The selection criteria are as follows. First, both warrants and their underlying stocks must have at 
least 20 trades a day, and their price must be greater than 5 baht. Second, warrants are selected if the number of trading days that satisfy the first condition is more than 40 
trading days. The adjusted warrant price is the average warrant price divided by the exercise ratio. The exercise ratio shows the number of stocks received when one warrant 
is exercised. For instance, the exercise ratio 1:2 means 1 warrant can be exercised for 2 common stocks. The days to maturity are the time to maturity of warrants in days as 
of January 1, 1997. The expiration date is the date that all issued warrants expire. Days of active warrant trading are the number of days with at least 20 warrant trades. The 
average warrant and stock price is the average price during active trading days, which are the days with at least 20 trades. 
Industry Company name 
Exercise 
price 
(baht) 
Exercise 
ratio  
(W:S) 
Days to 
maturity 
Expiration 
date 
No. of issued 
warrants  
(x106 units) 
Days of active 
warrant trading 
Average 
warrant price 
(baht) 
Average 
stock price 
(baht) 
Banking Industrial Finance Corp. 57.00 1:1.18846 310 7-Nov-97  59.90 137 12.21 58.73 
 Nakornthon Bank 46.74 1:1.06978 334 1-Dec-97  21.50 85 12.50 55.13 
 Thai Farmer Bank 181.69 1:1.00000 1,002 30-Sep-99  75.00 236 14.86 102.81 
Finance CMIC Finance and Sec. 90.00 1:1.00000 1,565 15-Apr-01 31.50 102 10.95 19.50 
 Dhana Siam Finance 89.87 1:3.62883 665 28-Oct-98  12.00 235 32.76 30.95 
 Ekachart Finance and Sec. 98.74 1:1.60018 867 18-May-99  15.75 112 9.20 19.13 
 Finance One 133.11 1:2.80976 803 15-Mar-99  24.00 46 25.34 33.87 
 General Finance and Sec. 96.05 1:2.34261 727 29-Dec-98  5.00 111 21.55 21.59 
 Kiatnakin Fin. and Sec. 102.00 1:1.00000 1,184 30-Mar-00  7.51 96 12.49 21.79 
 National Finance 100.00 1:1.03522 1,048 15-Nov-99  62.66 228 12.26 28.15 
 Nithipat Finance 129.79 1:1.00159 1,078 15-Dec-99  18.00 48 9.13 24.78 
 Securities One 284.09 1:1.07359 1,354 16-Sep-00  15.00 211 18.03 34.07 
 Siam General Factoring 30.00 1:1.00000 1,506 15-Feb-01 5.48 74 9.10 19.85 
 Wall Street 144.10 1:1.15891 730 1-Jan-99  4.79 59 9.12 31.70 
Property Italian Thai Development 314.00 1:1.00000 1,379 11-Oct-00  17.50 159 9.81 86.09 
 Land and House 175.00 1:1.64195 406 11-Feb-98  10.00 137 11.08 92.78 
 Quality House 41.00 1:1.19063 1,029 27-Oct-99  13.60 86 11.34 17.65 
Comm. United Communication 391.41 1:1.00406 1,225 10-May-00  11.07 224 14.65 123.85 
Energy Banpu  288.00 1:1.00000 683 15-Nov-98  6.00 66 85.57 331.23 
Average  146.98 1:1.38261 942  21.91 129 18.00 60.72 
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Table 2  Descriptive Statistics of Order, Limit Order Book and Trade of Warrants 
This Table presents the cross-sectional statistics of order file, limit order book, and trade file in the morning and afternoon sessions. Matched orders are the proportion of 
orders that are totally executed. Opened orders are the proportion of orders that are partially or never executed. Marketable orders are the orders that are executed 
immediately after being placed. Relative spread is the best ask minus the best bid prices divided by the midpoint of the bid and ask prices. Absolute spread is the difference 
between the best bid and ask prices. Market depth is the sum of shares at the best quotes in the limit order book. Total depth is the total orders in the limit order book. 
Liquidity immediacy is the ratio between market depth and total depth. Mid-quote price is the average of best bid and best ask prices. 
  Morning  Afternoon  Paired t-test  Signed Rank test 
  Mean Median S.D.  Mean Median S.D.  Mean of Diff 
N(+) 
Sig. 
N(-) 
Sig. 
Av. t-
stats 
 Median 
of Diff 
N(+) 
Sig.  
N(-) 
Sig. 
Av. t-
stats 
Panel A: Order file                 
Number of orders  366 294 282   264 212 205   102 17 0 5.61  77 18 0 5.79 
Matched orders  79.73% 80.39% 3.52%  70.69% 70.78% 2.99%  9.04% 18 0 6.84  9.4% 18 0 6.01 
Opened orders  20.27% 19.61% 3.52%  29.31% 29.22% 2.99%  -9.04% 0 18 -6.87  -9.4% 0 18 -6.01 
Marketable orders  38.27% 38.72% 2.26%  41.54% 41.32% 1.99%  -3.27% 0 16 -4.06  -3.15% 0 13 -2.93 
Order size (shares)  4,805 4,287 2,465  4,981 4,611 2,555  -176 1 6 -1.54  -118 0 6 -1.46 
Marketable order size (shares)  2,255 2,034 1,194  2,342 2,172 1,224  -87 0 12 -3.07  -82 0 9 -2.53 
Panel B: Limit order book                 
Relative spread  2.92% 2.29% 1.34%   2.41% 2.13% 0.78%   0.52% 12 0 2.47  0.21% 12 0 3.14 
Absolute spread  0.55 0.33 0.91  0.41 0.30 0.54  0.14 12 0 2.85  0.03 18 0 3.86 
Market depth (thousand 
shares) 
 
42.41 18.79 51.33 
 
49.96 22.10 61.56 
 
-7.55 0 6 -1.86  -2.05 0 12 -2.97 
Displayed depth 
(thousand shares) 
 
170.10 74.73 209.36  212.23 93.24 267.42  -42.12 0 17 -5.03  -13.05 0 18 -5.41 
Total depth (thousand shares)  601.40 397.36 667.35  852.18 570.09 950.76  -250.79 0 19 -13.28  -172.72 0 19 -10.60 
Liquidity immediacy  8.36% 8.58% 2.38%  6.57% 6.51% 2.14%  1.78% 17 0 4.45  1.75% 19 0 5.12 
Mid-quote price  18.29 12.45 18.05   18.11 12.32 18.02   0.18 14 0 2.98  0.14 15 0 3.52 
Panel C: Trade file                 
Number of trades  270 209 221  206 162 170  64 15 0 3.86  51 13 0 3.04 
Trade size  2,708 2,543 1,332  2,628 2,460 1,263  80 2 0 0.55  58 2 0 0.61 
Trading volume   36,433 35,042 16,089  34,203 31,081 14,680  2,230 5 0 1.18  1,887 6 1 1.13 
Return  1.70% 1.39% 0.92%  -0.87% -1.06% 0.99%  2.57% 13 0 2.73  2.91% 12 0 3.00 
SD of return  0.98% 0.60% 0.57%  0.63% 0.58% 0.39%  0.04% 8 0 1.81  0.03% 12 0 2.24 
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Table 3  Descriptive Statistics of Order, Limit Order Book and Trade of Stocks 
This Table presents the cross-sectional statistics of order file, limit order book, and trade file in the morning and afternoon sessions. Matched orders are the proportion of 
orders that are totally executed. Opened orders are the proportion of orders that are partially or never executed. Marketable orders are the orders that are executed 
immediately after being placed. Relative spread is the best ask minus the best bid prices divided by the midpoint of the bid and ask prices. Absolute spread is the difference 
between the best bid and ask prices. Market depth is the sum of shares at the best quotes in the limit order book. Total depth is the total orders in the limit order book. 
Liquidity immediacy is the ratio between market depth and total depth. Mid-quote price is the average of best bid and best ask prices. 
  Morning Afternoon Paired t-test Signed Rank test 
  Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean of Diff 
N(+) 
Sig. 
N(-) 
Sig. 
Av. t-
stats 
Median 
of Diff 
N(+) 
Sig. 
N(-) 
Sig. 
Av. t-
stats 
Panel A: Order file              
Number of orders  331 177 338 229 119 222 102 15 0 5.43 49 15 0 4.87 
Matched orders  75.61% 76.91% 5.15% 71.40% 71.98% 3.78% 4.21% 7 1 1.97 3.75% 6 1 1.73 
Opened orders  24.39% 23.09% 5.15% 28.60% 28.02% 3.78% -4.21% 1 6 -1.91 -3.75% 1 6 -1.69 
Marketable orders  37.75% 37.89% 4.06% 43.97% 43.86% 3.23% -5.22% 0 16 -6.77 -4.58% 0 19 -6.19 
Order size (shares)  3,478 3,333 1,193 4,357 4,482 1,505 -879 0 5 -4.30 -677 0 15 -5.22 
Marketable order size (shares)  1,568 1,473 575 2,072 2,118 759 -504 0 14 -4.43 -447 0 18 -5.98 
Panel B: Limit order book              
Relative spread  1.86% 1.85% 0.71% 1.50% 1.46% 0.42% 0.36% 12 0 3.21 0.36% 16 0 3.98 
Absolute spread   1.12  0.52 1.78 0.85 0.46 1.22  0.27 13 0 3.49 0.10 17 0 4.34 
Market depth (thousand shares)  65.58 26.61 55.69 84.95 33.03 96.59 -19.37 0 10 -2.60 -12.08 0 18 -5.39 
Displayed depth 
(thousand shares) 
 
169.05 64.82 169.96 217.79 97.88 222.04 -48.74 0 15 -4.21 -25.81 0 18 -6.45 
Total depth (thousand shares)  485.72 167.37 584.23 669.14 267.56 817.08 -183.42 0 19 -9.34 -82.37 0 19 -9.74 
Liquidity immediacy  11.73% 11.43% 3.60% 11.84% 10.53% 3.10% -0.11% 1 3 -0.38 -0.02% 1 0 0.41 
Mid-quote price  61.28 31.96 74.06 61.31 31.91 74.51  -0.03 14 0 2.59 0.19 14 0 2.49 
Panel C: Trade file              
Number of trades  231 130 244 195 93 195 36 6 3 2.75 19 5 6 -0.01 
Trade size  1,976 2,020 667 2,081 1,932 752 -105 0 4 -2.02 -54 0 8 -2.46 
Trading volume   85,478 67,900 60,232 93,690 78,077 68,678 -8,213 0 6 -2.95 -3,065 0 7 -2.27 
Return  -0.14% -0.03% 0.74% 0.19% 0.11% 0.73% -0.33% 1 3 -1.10 -0.01% 1 4 -0.34 
SD of return  0.44% 0.42% 0.31% 0.39% 0.37% 0.20% 0.06% 12 0 5.54 0.05% 12 0 2.98 
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Table 4  Intraday Patterns of Warrants  
The intraday patterns of interested variables are estimated as follows:  
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where Ykt denotes the variables of interest, which consist of spread, market depth, displayed depth, total depth, immediacy, market order ratio, 
volatility, and order volume. For each warrant, these variables are regressed against a set of dummies and controlled variables. This Table 
reports the cross-sectional averages of the coefficients and the adjusted R2. The statistical significance is based on the signed tests on the 
estimated coefficients, where ** and * indicate a 99% and 95% significance level, respectively. 
 Spread Market depth Displayed depth Total depth 
Liquidity 
immediacy 
Market order 
ratio Volatility 
Order 
volume 
Constant 0.02695** 45,766** 188,825** 712,856** 0.07564** 0.39721** 0.00650** 442,217** 
10:00–10:30 0.01128** -8,177** -56,208** -273,964** 0.03046** -0.06175** 0.00305** 462,681** 
10:30–11:00 0.00265 -2,490** -23,934** -154,701** 0.01348** -0.01039 0.00052 59,429** 
11:00–11:30 -0.00021 -1,731** -9,407** -87,402** 0.00380** -0.00959 -0.00070** -94,369** 
11:30–12:00 -0.00102** -1,756* -3,824** -41,210** -0.00195 0.00548 -0.00104** -148,828** 
12:00–12:30 -0.00125** -2,622** -232 -30 -0.00616** 0.00361 -0.00105** -208,693** 
14:30–15:00 -0.00172 -1,014* 1,826** 49,333** -0.00882** 0.02971** -0.00058* -122,825** 
15:00–15:30 -0.00214 343 11,965** 102,521** -0.01182** 0.00452 -0.00027* -121,051** 
15:30–16:00 -0.00306* 4,533** 26,826** 157,865** -0.01063** 0.00460 -0.00094** -64,527** 
16:00–16:30 -0.00452** 12,915** 52,988** 247,589** -0.00835** 0.03380** 0.00100** 238,184** 
Monday 0.00250** -4,403* -16,987* -56,948* 0.00125 -0.01554** -0.00007 -57,692** 
Tuesday -0.00114* -549 -7,224 -7,104 -0.00138 0.00310 0.00005 -14,476 
Wednesday -0.00121** 1,066 5,515 7,895 0.00318 0.00901** -0.00002 18,358 
Thursday -0.00068 4,974 12,431 6,243 0.00176 0.00457 -0.00031** 22,554** 
Friday 0.00052 -1,088 6,265 49,914** -0.00480** -0.00114 0.00035 31,256 
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Table 5  Intraday Patterns of Underlying Stocks 
The intraday patterns of interested variables are estimated as follows:  
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where Ykt denotes the variables of interest, which consist of spread, market depth, displayed depth, total depth, immediacy, market order ratio, 
volatility, and order volume. For each warrant, these variables are regressed against a set of dummies and controlled variables. This Table 
reports the cross-sectional averages of the coefficients and the adjusted R2. The statistical significance is based on the signed tests on the 
estimated coefficients, where ** and * indicate a 99% and 95% significance level, respectively. 
 Spread Market depth Displayed depth Total depth 
Liquidity 
immediacy 
Market order 
ratio Volatility 
Order 
volume 
Constant 0.01697** 74,189** 190,710** 567,240** 0.11778** 0.40069** 0.00418** 300,538** 
10:00–10:30 0.00713** -13,313** -57,222** -201,051** 0.01151 -0.09295** 0.00254** 246,810** 
10:30–11:00 0.00189 -8,208** -28,367** -107,544** -0.00180 -0.03216** 0.00026 10,918 
11:00–11:30 0.00024 -9,765** -15,111** -62,356** -0.00454** -0.01239* -0.00044** -69,308** 
11:30–12:00 -0.00047* -6,945** -5,033** -29,400** -0.00275 0.00707 -0.00038** -104,101** 
12:00–12:30 -0.00083** -4,806** -2,581 -7,238 -0.00486* 0.01429* -0.00067* -132,929** 
14:30–15:00 -0.00148** 2,752** 10,375** 32,990** -0.00215 0.03901** -0.00049** -44,034** 
15:00–15:30 -0.00192** 7,542** 20,433** 82,720** -0.00086 0.01419** -0.00059** -36,801** 
15:30–16:00 -0.00219** 10,160** 28,778** 121,775** -0.00013 0.01078* -0.00066** -30,776 
16:00–16:30 -0.00235** 22,583** 48,728** 170,104** 0.00560* 0.05215** 0.00044 160,222** 
Monday 0.00064 -10,344** 2,996 23,609** -0.00366 -0.01066** -0.00003 29,664 
Tuesday -0.00040 -16,574 -27,015 -46,399 0.00350 -0.00092 -0.00006 -40,443 
Wednesday -0.00010 -13,131 -21,917 -64,368 0.01004 0.00808* -0.00002 -11,643 
Thursday -0.00039* 42,043 43,139 62,377 -0.00357 0.00093 -0.00019 2,556 
Friday 0.00025 -1,994 2,796 24,782 -0.00631* 0.00258 0.00032** 19,866 
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Table 6  Intraday Variation of Adverse Selection Cost  
This Table presents the intraday variation of the adverse selection estimated from six 
decomposition models: Madhavan et al. (1997), De Jong et al. (1996), Glosten and 
Harris (1988), George et al. (1991), Lin et al. (1995), and Huang and Stoll (1997). 
 MRR97 DNR96 GH88 GKN91 LSB95 HS97 
Panel A: Adverse selection component of warrants 
10:00–10:30 0.215 0.254 0.257 0.552 0.233 0.041 
10:30–11:00 0.221 0.275 0.276 0.780 0.265 0.141 
11:00–11:30 0.229 0.280 0.321 0.755 0.252 0.138 
11:30–12:00 0.206 0.292 0.292 0.742 0.254 0.172 
12:00–12:30 0.222 0.354 0.387 0.715 0.216 0.152 
14:30–15:00 0.251 0.276 0.315 0.660 0.214 0.153 
15:00–15:30 0.218 0.293 0.309 0.761 0.260 0.140 
15:30–16:00 0.211 0.276 0.287 0.741 0.231 0.155 
16:00–16:30 0.176 0.197 0.216 0.728 0.191 0.114 
Mean 0.211 0.256 0.274 0.609 0.216 0.126 
Median 0.213 0.261 0.273 0.669 0.206 0.105 
SD 0.103 0.153 0.168 0.148 0.084 0.064 
 
Panel B: Adverse selection component of stocks 
10:00–10:30 0.175 0.253 0.265 0.495 0.316 0.092 
10:30–11:00 0.182 0.324 0.328 0.657 0.242 0.142 
11:00–11:30 0.159 0.265 0.265 0.671 0.205 0.168 
11:30–12:00 0.150 0.291 0.267 0.684 0.212 0.140 
12:00–12:30 0.132 0.246 0.240 0.625 0.186 0.149 
14:30–15:00 0.145 0.246 0.233 0.542 0.167 0.136 
15:00–15:30 0.158 0.254 0.266 0.619 0.173 0.140 
15:30–16:00 0.134 0.230 0.229 0.577 0.195 0.128 
16:00–16:30 0.146 0.209 0.215 0.546 0.153 0.094 
Mean 0.155 0.246 0.256 0.479 0.164 0.135 
Median 0.164 0.245 0.242 0.474 0.197 0.125 
SD 0.063 0.152 0.166 0.220 0.093 0.060 
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Table 7  Correlations of Spread with Market Depth, Total Depth, Liquidity Immediacy and Market Order Ratio  
for 15-Minute Intervals 
This Table presents the correlations of spread with market depth, total depth, immediacy, and market order proportion for all 15-miniute 
intervals in a day. Spread is the difference between the best ask price and bid price divided by the midpoint of the bid and ask prices. Market 
depth is the number of shares at the best bid price and best ask price. Total depth is the number of shares standing in the limit order book. 
Immediacy is the ratio between market depth and total depth. Market order proportion is the ratio between the number of market order arrivals 
and the number of total order arrivals. The reported correlations are the averages of correlations of individual warrants and underlying stocks. 
The statistical significance is based on the signed tests on individual correlations, where ** and * indicate a 99% and 95% significance level, 
respectively. 
 Correlations of warrant spread with  Correlations of underlying stock spread with 
Interval Market depth 
Displayed 
depth 
Total 
depth Immediacy 
Market 
order 
ratio 
 Market 
depth 
Displayed 
depth 
Total 
depth Immediacy 
Market 
order ratio 
10:00–10:30 -0.159** -0.165* -0.239** 0.183** -0.299** -0.023 -0.013 -0.198** 0.261** -0.205** 
10:30–11:00 -0.081 -0.114 -0.178** 0.206** -0.187** 0.052 0.038 -0.142** 0.231** -0.154** 
11:00–11:30 -0.060 -0.108* -0.171** 0.229** -0.157* 0.059 0.050 -0.130** 0.209* -0.071 
11:30–12:00 -0.040 -0.080* -0.163** 0.211** -0.125** 0.050 0.057 -0.101** 0.147 -0.083** 
12:00–12:30 -0.036 -0.082 -0.158** 0.204** -0.097* 0.065 0.078 -0.103** 0.170 -0.070 
14:30–15:00 0.000 -0.051 -0.125* 0.162** -0.089** 0.020 0.033 -0.088** 0.083 -0.045 
15:00–15:30 -0.021 -0.056 -0.143** 0.161* -0.105** 0.115 0.111 -0.048 0.167** -0.072** 
15:30–16:00 -0.026 -0.045 -0.124** 0.141** -0.089** 0.090 0.085 -0.074* 0.151** -0.025 
16:00–16:30 -0.014 -0.054 -0.107** 0.171** -0.085** 0.064 0.085 -0.075** 0.144** -0.025 
Monday -0.134** -0.141** -0.230** 0.220** -0.183** -0.011 -0.049* -0.211** 0.183** -0.113* 
Tuesday -0.078** -0.104* -0.155** 0.134** -0.165** 0.007 -0.012 -0.125** 0.131* -0.116** 
Wednesday -0.079** -0.124** -0.181** 0.184** -0.183** 0.012 0.005 -0.173** 0.186** -0.160** 
Thursday 0.005 -0.046 -0.179** 0.276** -0.169** 0.055 0.072 -0.164** 0.224** -0.140** 
Friday -0.048 -0.109* -0.189** 0.256** -0.118** 0.068 0.063 -0.117** 0.248** -0.129** 
All -0.043 -0.084* -0.168** 0.213** -0.155**  0.034 0.026 -0.140** 0.192** -0.132** 
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Figure 1  Trading Volume of Warrants and Their Underlying Stocks  
This Figure presents the trading volume of warrants and their underlying stocks from January 1994 to 
December 1997. The volume is computed based on the warrants available for trading in 1997. 
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Figure 2  Intraday Patterns of Spread and Market Depth of Warrants and 
Stocks 
This Figure shows the intraday pattern of average spread and average market depth in each 30-minute 
interval of warrants and stocks. The line represents spread, and the bar represents market depth. 
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Figure 3  Intraday Patterns of Immediacy and Total Depth of Warrants and 
Stocks 
This Figure shows the intraday pattern of average liquidity immediacy and average total depth in each 
30-minute interval of warrants and stocks. The line represents liquidity immediacy, and the bar 
represents total depth. 
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Figure 4  Intraday Patterns of Market Order Ratio of Warrants and Stocks  
This Figure shows the intraday pattern of average market order ratio in each 30-minute interval of 
warrants and stocks. The market order ratio is the number of market orders divided by the number of 
total orders in the interval. 
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Figure 5  Intraday Patterns of Volatility of Warrants and Stocks  
This Figure shows the intraday pattern of average volatility in each 30-minute interval of warrants and 
stocks. The volatility is the standard deviation of return in the interval. 
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Volume of warrants (thousand baht) Volume of stocks (thousand baht)
 
 
Figure 6  Intraday Patterns of Order Volume of Warrants and Stocks  
This Figure shows the intraday pattern of average order volume in each 30-minute interval of warrants 
and stocks. 
 
 
